4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

nationalities as a Federation of Soviet National Republics. Striving to create the really free and voluntary union of the working classes of all the nationalities of Russia, the 3rd Congress of Soviets will limit itself to the establishment of the principles only on which the Federation of the Soviet Republics in Russia will be built, allowing the workers and peasants of every nationality to take independent decisions in their own Soviet Congresses as to whether and on what conditions they wish to take part in the Federal Government and other Federal institutions.'

The Federation, having been accepted by the All-Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee in February 1919, was approved by the 1st Ukrainian Congress of Soviets in the following month. It is clear that this declaration remained in force when, after the collapse of the Volunteer movement and the failure of the 'Petlyurians', the Soviets were restored in the Ukraine. And it is a notable fact that, notwithstanding the considerable changes in the constitution of U.S.S.R. which were introduced between the years 1920 and 1936, the Ukrainians together with the other 'minority nationalities' retained the right, in theory, to opt out of the Union. Only at the 8th Extraordinary Congress of Soviets, summoned to discuss 'the Stalin Constitution' of 1936, were certain limitations (not included in the published texts of the Constitution) introduced by Stalin himself. 'So that the right [of a Republic] to leave the Union shall not be an ephemeral right it is necessary:

(*a*) that the Republic should not be surrounded on all sides by territories of the Soviet Union, but should lie on its boundaries, because in the opposite case it would be impossible for her to leave the Union;

(*b*) that the population of the Republic should not be less than a certain minimum, because in the opposite case she would not be able to defend herself against the attacks of Imperialist beasts of prey;

(*c*) that in the population one nationality should form a compact majority.'

During the years 1921–2 the Ukrainian Soviets were otherwise engaged than in studying constitutional questions. The liquidation of the Volunteer Army in the Crimea and the suppression of the numerous bands of the *atamans* prolonged the period of warfare and the Red Armies terrorized the exhausted countryside. Many towns were becoming deserted, and vast stretches of land were left fallow by a peasantry which had neither the courage nor the security to sow or to reap. Black typhus decimated the destitute population, and in the winter of 1920–21 a serious famine developed which became worse during the spring and summer months. Although the

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RDl Ukraine RDl

conditions for peaceful labour had somewhat improved, since the war had come to an end and only reprisals and 'the settling of accounts' were going on, the weather contributed to make the new harvest catastrophically poor. The absence of any sort of organization but that of the police and the army, and the general exhaustion of the economic structure of Russia, produced conditions which were unparalleled in modern history. European charitable organizations, with all the goodwill in the world, proved inadequate to cope with the calamity. In the Ukraine it is estimated that not less than three million people died from hunger or from diseases resulting from it. Incredible horrors formed a background to this human tragedy; there were, for instance, numerous cases of cannibalism authenticated.

The ruin of the famine; the naval mutiny in Kronstadt with all its formidable implications; the stubborn armed struggle of the peasantry against the Soviet régime in the Tambov and adjoining Governments—all these factors induced Lenin, himself in 1922 a very sick man, to embark upon the New Economic Policy. It was a compromise between 'the Communism of the war period' and 'small bourgeois elements'—a compromise imposed by the dire necessity of the moment.

The same causes which imposed the New Economic Policy inclined the Soviet leaders towards a policy of conciliation in regard to 'the minority nationalities'. In the Caucasus it had been necessary to concentrate three Army Corps to suppress the insurrection of the Mussulman mountaineers of Daghestan during the winter of 1921–2; the Georgian Social Democratic Republic had recently been overthrown as the result of a six weeks' campaign in which four Army Corps were engaged, and the Armenian mountaineers of Karabagh were waging a guerilla war which was only terminated by an amnesty at the end of 1922; in Turkestan the savage Basmachi movement continued to devastate the country until 1926.

The Declaration of 30 December 1922 preceded the formation of 'the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics' (U.S.S.R.), the Constitution of which was published on 6 June 1923. This declaration confirmed in a different form the decision of the 3rd Congress of Soviets of 24 January 1918. It affirmed that the U.S.S.R. had been 'constituted by the free and voluntary union of free and equal Socialist Republics'. 'Representation of the different nationalities' in the central organ of government was provided in a kind of 'second chamber' which consisted of 114 members.

In the Ukraine the Bolsheviks were more successful than in Caucasia in recruiting to their ranks many of the former separatists

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

and to wander off into the steppe 'where the eyes look'. Until the Bolsheviks erected barbed wire all along the frontier, the Volhynian peasants used to cross the Polish border in large bodies with their women and children and cattle—sometimes a thousand strong and more—with the merciless detachments of the G.P.U. hot in pursuit, held off by an armed rear-guard. According to reports appearing in the Polish Press in 1932 great numbers of these fugitive peasants were held in quarantine camps in Poland. At the same time gangs of fugitives from Central Russia and the Ukraine made their way into Transcaucasia under the leadership of ex-soldiers; conditions here, where a struggle against forced collectivization was also in progress, were little better than in the Ukraine, and large numbers, Russians and Tartars and Tats from the Talish region, forced their way across the Araks frontier into the northern provinces of Iran.

The abolition of small and 'average' farming, the disorganization in the newly formed *kolkhozy*, the passive resistance of the peasants, and the bestial brutality of the methods which accompanied the enforcement of the new system, brought about the famine of 1932–3. The first news of famine in the Ukraine came from the Polish frontier in the autumn of 1932. It became known that domestic animals were perishing wholesale and that the mortality among the population was enormous. Already, even in the summer, there was no more bread in the Ukraine. Millions of human beings were set in motion. Part of these great crowds infested the towns in the hope of being able to survive until the next harvest. But the main flow of movement was directed towards the northern Caucasus, the regions beyond the Volga, Siberia and Turkestan. In many districts only the old people remained where they were in the hope of somehow surviving on potatoes. There were wide districts which were almost completely abandoned by the population. Whole villages went to ruin, and the once prosperous gardens and fields were abandoned to weeds.

Early in 1933, before the time of spring sowing, orders were issued to drive back the migrant hordes by force to their villages. Great numbers of peasants who were arrested and coralled in camps died because they were not fed. Those who returned to their lands, sick and hungry, found that they had to set to work with spades and staves because only about a fifth part of the horses remained and most of these were too weak to work. A particular foreign correspondent who obtained permission to travel in the regions of Kiev, Chernigov, Kharkov and Poltava in the autumn of 1933, affirms that, according to statements which were made to him in the offices of the local administrations, about 10 per cent of the population of

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

● 731 South-Eastern Russia died of hunger in the first months of 1933. As in 1921–2 numerous cases of cannibalism were recorded.

665 661 In spite of this vast tragedy, self-satisfied and triumphant speeches were a feature of the Ukrainian Congress of Soviets which met at Kharkov in 1935. 'For glorious Ukraine the last years have been, as in the rest of our country, a period of brilliant unheard of achievements. The rapacious rural *kulak* class has been completely destroyed, annihilated. Never will the heroism of those days be forgotten! Never will the loathing against the oppressors disappear! Those were not idle words which Lenin wrote when he affirmed that the principal enemy of our Bolshevism is the peasant! Thousands of the best sons of our country have lost their lives in the great and ruthless struggle.' 'Against this enemy', in the words of *Pravda*, 'the economic structure which carries along with it joyous culture and a happy life to millions of Ukrainians suffering for centuries from privations has at last triumphed in the country.' Stalin's revolutionary Communist régime proved, as ever, logical. If 'thousands of the best sons of our country' had really lost their lives in 'the great and ruthless struggle' against the peasantry, the peasants had to count their losses in millions.

000 But notwithstanding the brilliant victory proclaimed on the internal front in 1935 the Soviet Government had new reasons for anxiety in the radical change which had taken place in the European situation as a result of the attainment of power by the Nazi Party in Germany. The official doctrine of the Nazi Government was based on 'the right of the German people to an adequate living space', and the Third Reich of Adolf Hitler, in search of a better and happier future, was taking a dangerous interest in the east and south-east of Europe. It was now nearly twenty years since *Die Rückführung des Ostheeres*; and the glib attribution of the military catastrophe of Germany in the last war to the evils of Marxism had had the result of reviving in a new generation of Germans all those vague aspirations after world dominion which recur from time to time to compensate that unfortunate people for the frustration which has been their historical lot.

In glowing passages in *Mein Kampf* Adolf Hitler had waxed lyrical on the subject of the Ukraine and the Urals, and the Führer seemed prepared to abandon the oceanic and colonial dreams of William II in favour of a continental imperialism which might carry the Germans into Asia in the first great movement in history of a people from west to east. In 1934 the ten years' Non-Aggression Pact concluded between Germany and Poland appeared to Soviet statesmen to be the first step towards a collaboration in the east at

tons of grain or about 75% of the total amount that they secured in the whole of the former Russian Empire. 651 661

This led to new clashes and with the suppression of the larger armed partisan bands, there grew up a new feeling of ugliness that boded ill for the security of the whole regime. The success of the Communists in the industrial centres was thus balanced by their failure to win over any substantial part of the rural population.

In the cities the new regime[1] met with problems of another kind. The workers in the great coal and iron industry where Communism was strongest had at a very early date expelled the managers and foremen and had taken over themselves the operation of the plants, many of which had been ruined in the civil war. Now they found that they were not able to restore production. Industry practically came to a halt and by the end of 1921 there was only one blast furnace operating in Ukraine. The production of pig-iron dropped to 11,300 tons, or barely 3% of the pre-war production. The railroads suffered the same fate. There was no way of repairing them and without a trained administrative staff, they almost stopped functioning. This, in turn, increased unemployment and a lack of food in the cities and once more the city dwellers began to stream out into the country districts. 433 369 [327]

As a final blow there came in 1920 one of those periods of drought which have recurred sporadically in Ukraine throughout the centuries. In view of the general decay in transportation and the ravages of the war, this became serious and the situation grew even worse when the same phenomenon was repeated in 1921. Between the drought and the raiding detachments, the peasants had no reserves of grain and a famine broke out which cost the lives of several million Ukrainians. 731 ●

This famine was very definitely the result of Communist mismanagement, plus the drought, but the Soviet regime was unable to take any effective counter-measures. When its extent was realized, the regime allowed through the League of Nations the organization of the American Relief Administration, under Herbert Hoover. This collected and sent to the stricken areas large quantities of grain but it carried on its work with such impartiality that

[1] [Ukrainian Soviet Republic established 1919 -- Analyst]

● 73/ it ignored for humanitarian motives the discontent of the peasants and its operations enabled the Soviet regime to master a storm which would otherwise have endangered its very existence. It is interesting in this connection that the Soviet regime only with the greatest reluctance allowed relief work to be carried on in the Ukraine, where the famine conditions were the worst. Their only interest was in the Volga area inhabited by Great Russians and they tried to use the assumed independence of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic as an excuse for refusing to allow help to be extended.

ooo Thus by the spring of 1922 the policy of Militant Communism had broken down at every point. The system had shown its political, economic and cultural bankruptcy and its sole success had been among certain groups of idealists abroad who were infatuated with the resolution with which the Soviets had broken with the old order. Yet this was a poor foundation and it was obvious that something drastic had to be done, if the Soviet system was to be saved.

CHAPTER TEN

The Famine

In 1921, the great famine which had swept over Ukraine had been the result of a failure of the crops, a prolonged drought and the excesses of Militant Communism which had demoralized the country. The Soviets, more or less unwillingly, allowed the despatch of foreign assistance and this saved the lives of millions. There was to be no interference in the punishment of the obstinate peasants this time.

In the fall of 1929, just as compulsory collectivization was being introduced, the government in Moscow made an important change in the agricultural set-up, for it transferred the Commissariat of Agriculture to the central group by establishing an All-Union Commissariat which was to be in control of all agriculture in the Soviet Union. This meant that in Ukraine all of the work which had been previously done by the local authorities was now transferred to Moscow. The republic commissariats ceased to have the power to pursue individual plans for improving the conditions of the soil, for varying the crops as their own advisers decided or as the population felt it necessary. Everything was to be done from the centre and the Ukrainian Soviet Government was compelled to hand over all of its research stations and other institutions to Muscovite control. This put a stop to the intensive development of Ukrainian agriculture which had been fostered by the Ukrainian land code and introduced the new system in which the peasants were in the same position as the workers in the factories.

At the same time the central regime ceased to make public the actual figures of production on the ground that they might betray to outside nations important facts as to the Soviet development. From this time on estimates and achievements were given only in

[1929 – All-Union Commissariat of Agriculture was established 93 --Amlyst]

sabotage of the income of the party and the government in the branch of village agriculture." 651 685

The machine tractor stations were staffed by men largely alien to the Ukrainian countryside. The more fanatical Communists were placed in these political detachments and were, in effect, told to supplement or replace the local administration in the exercise of pressure and terror upon both the heads and the members of the kolhosps. To aid them in their work Moscow sent to Ukraine a Russian Pavel Postyshev as a special plenipotentiary of the Central Committee with 7,000 party workers from the Russian Republic. 241 511

The work of these special "commissions" and "brigades" was marked by the utmost severity. They entered the villages, and made the most thorough searches of the houses and barns of every peasant. They dug up the earth, broke into the walls of buildings and the stoves in which the peasants tried to hide their last handfuls of food. They even in places took specimens of the fecal matter from the toilets in the effort to learn in that way by analysis whether the peasants had stolen government property and were eating grain. Wherever they found any, the peasants were severely punished, while the detachments carried off not only grain but everything edible.

The same reports came from every corner of Ukraine. "They requisitioned everything that could be eaten" was the report from the village of Zorich in the district of Poltava. In one village in the district of Odesa, "they collected all the grain, potatoes, beets to the last kilogram" and in other places they even took half-baked loaves of bread from the stove. In at least one of these commissions, Molotov, then head of the Council of Ministers, took a personal part.

The natural result was a famine of unprecedented severity. The villages had been hungry in the autumn. After these searches commenced, they literally starved. An Englishman, M. Magridge, wrote in the *Fortnightly Review* for May, 1933: "During a recent visit to Ukraine, I have seen a little of the war which the Soviet government is carrying on against the peasants. The fields were 731 661

[result of excessive grain requisitions in 1933 -- Analyst]

731 waste as in a real war and the poverty had spread still further.
661 On one side there were millions of peasants with bodies swollen from hunger; on the other side, soldiers, members of the GPU, carrying out the orders of the dictatorship of the proletariat. They hurled themselves on the region like a pack of locusts and seized everything edible. They shot and hung thousands of peasants, sometimes whole villages; they made of the richest country in the world a melancholy wilderness."

Reports from all sections of Ukraine have listed with depressing regularity the articles of food that were eaten. They included grass, weeds, bark, dead animals, field mice, dogs, cats. Finally, cannibalism broke out and in many places sausages were found that were made of human flesh, either of people who had died or who were killed for food. The extent of this last is shown when in 1936, among the prisoners of Solovki, there were three hundred twenty-five persons guilty of cannibalism, seventy-five men and two hundred and fifty women.

An observer in the spring of 1933 gives this picture of a Ukrainian village: "In the centre of the village, beside the ruins of the church which had been blown up was the bazaar. All the people in it had swollen faces, they were not talkative, but were silent and speechless. Their movements were unsteady, for their legs and arms were swollen. They sold or bought cornstalks, pounded corncobs, a black powder made of Russian thistle, roots, and the lower parts of water plants. This assortment of village wares was a diet which did not save the people from death by starvation but merely by increasing their sufferings, postponed it a little."

The agronome A. S. who in March and April, 1933, was in the villages of Izbinske and Starytsya, Vovchansky region, Kharkiv district, wrote: "The people daily died in dozens. The corpses lay in the houses for several days for there was no one to bury them. Pits were dug in the cemeteries with great difficulty, large enough to hold several persons. The corpses were piled on carts like wood and carried to the pits and thrown in like logs without any of the customary or religious rites. They fell as they would,

head down, or on their side or standing—a terrible sight. The gravedigger of to-day might be a corpse to-morrow." 731 661

The bodies of the dead lay in all the villages, along the roads and in the fields. Special brigades were formed in the villages to bury the dead but they were too weak to collect all the corpses and these were devoured by those dogs which had escaped being eaten and had gone savage. The roads were deserted for it was dangerous for one or two people to walk together because of the danger of attack by robbers who sought to rob them or to kill them for cannibalistic purposes.

Under such conditions many of the people closed up their huts tightly, lighted their stoves and inhaled the fumes to commit suicide.

In the spring, when those who had survived broke from the fields the unripe ears of grain, they were seized by the government agencies on the charge of stealing socialist and government property, while the "light cavalry," the armed Comsomols and the members of the Communist Party, shot these "barbers," as they were called in the press contemptuously, like hares.

Thousands tried to secure work in the state agricultural enterprises (the radhosps). The agronome B. B. wrote: "In going around the experimental station in Poltavshchyna, I saw under a haystack a number of people. To my questions, the manager of the station, a Russian in origin, told me that they were peasants of the neighborhood who had come in large numbers to the radhosp, hoping to find work and thus have the money to buy food. Since they did not have the strength to return home, they lay down under the haystack. Many died there and he added, pointing to fresh earth,' There are the mounds where we buried those individualists. What trouble the Khakhals have been.' "

The younger and more venturesome fled to other Soviet Republics in search of work and food. Thousands departed from Ukraine without permission, for this was not given, and crowded the offices of the railroads, the wharfs and the junctions. They often found a tragic end. Prof. O. O. tells of a case of which he was a witness. "In March, 1933, at the station in Vladikavkaz (Caucasus) there gathered a mass of peasants with bags on their

73/ backs, waiting for a freight train. Agents of the NKVD held them
66/ up and took away their grain. They begged together and singly and prayed but it did not help. Then one peasant climbed out on a high tree near the station and began to cry out about all the horrors of the famine in Ukraine. He cursed the party, the government, its leaders and the NKVD. A crowd quickly gathered and soon came the agents of the NKVD who began to harangue the hearers and urged the "orator" to come down quickly, threatening him with life imprisonment. He was immovable; then the NKVD called for the local fire department who were told to turn their hoses on the tree. The peasant climbed higher and then suddenly threw himself down like a stone."

In the spring of 1933 the starving masses with their gray faces moved into the large cities. They formed lines for the "buying of bread"* or, begging, they surrounded the mills. They died by thousands in the streets of Kharkiv, Kiev, Dnipropetrovsk, and the other cities. In many cases the police cars simply picked up the dead and dying every morning and carried them out of the city where they were thrown into pits. There were established in the cities and their environs "therapeutic hospitals" near which were vans covered with tarpaulins. These were used to collect the sufferers and the hospitals were simply places to separate the dead and the dying.

The children suffered terribly and thousands were picked up on the streets. Parents often abandoned their children, usually near police stations, in the hope that they would be picked up and taken to refugee camps but here they were little better off. Prof. M. M. testified that near Kharkiv the "NKVD opened a large children's concentration camp, the 'Barracks of death' as it was

[435]

* In the beginning of 1933 at the height of the famine in Ukraine, the USSR opened shops in the cities where grain was sold at a doubled price, i.e. commercial prices—4 karb. for 1 kg. of white and 3 karb. for 1 kg. of black bread. The peasant received from the government for the obligatory "sale" of grain 90 kop. for 16 kg. of wheat. These commercial prices had to be paid for in foreign currency or in gold or silver.

termed" and here by poor treatment at least forty percent of the ten thousand gathered in, died. 731 661

The urban population felt the shortage because of the reduction of the bread ration for the unemployed to two hundred grams a day. The majority could not patronize the commercial shops for they had nothing with which to pay and the legal allowance of other products as fat, sugar and barley were either reduced or omitted. Even the more highly qualified of the intelligentsia were obliged to sell all their trinkets and gold teeth to secure some food. The prices allowed were ridiculous. One teacher at these stores received for a silver dollar "500 grams of sugar, a piece of soap and 200 grams of rice."

Physicians were forbidden to enter "hunger" in the records of illness and death. They were ordered to give as the cause of death "BBO" (absence of white corpuscles). Sometimes it was recorded as "childish" or "old age" weakness, "paralysis of the heart," "diarrhea," all symptoms of death by starvation.

It is impossible to estimate accurately the number of deaths, for even the indefatigable NKVD gave up the attempt to list the deaths along the roads, in the fields, and in the streets of the cities. Villages died out and this was indicated by the use of black flags on certain houses. In these cases no attempt was made to keep the records in order. The so-called "therapeutic hospitals" did not turn over their records or admit to their files the workers of the ZATS (The Records of the Acts of the Civil Population), who were the collaborators of the NKVD. Thus, in one of these therapeutic hospitals in Kiev there were at least 5,000 deaths from starvation that were not recorded in the official statistics. 165 731 661

Of course, none of these hardships were felt by the highly placed Communists and party officials. They received their food through party channels which were not accessible to the ordinary residents of the city or the kolhosps. [554]

It is difficult to estimate accurately the number who perished in the famine, but it was approximately 4,800,000. This is certainly an underestimate, although certain other calculations will place the number between five and six million.

[-famine in Ukraine, 1933-- Analyst]

Ukraine Under the Soviets

731 There is the frequent idea that the famine was specifically
661 directed against the rich peasants and the kurkuls. This is utterly
[565] false, for these had been liquidated earlier. The blow of 1933 fell chiefly upon the poorer classes who had always supported the Soviet regime and who regarded their suffering in the beginning as a mistake which Moscow would do its best to correct. In the same way it was the Ukrainian workmen of the smaller cities who bore the brunt of the hardships. It was the direct triumph of the Russian Bolsheviks over the Ukrainian poor.

185 Another proof that the famine occurred in connection with
731 the plans of Moscow was the fact that Postyshev, besides his official post, held that of general inspector of the Ministry of Grain Production for resettlement. It turned out later that he was given the general task of preparing a plan for an immigration into Ukraine from various portions of the Soviet Union. The dislocation of the population was worked out in detail. Millions of Russians, Byelorussians, Uzbeks, etc., were to be sent in to complete the work of rerussification. Especial pains were devoted to the regions close to Russia on the Left Bank of the Dnieper and there was talk at one time of annexing to the Russian Republic the Kharkiv-Donbas industrial region, but this did not fall in with the plans of Stalin.

[423] The result of the famine was the final stabilization of the collective system of agriculture and the breaking of the old mode of life throughout the whole of Ukraine. More than that, it established the fact that in the economic sphere Moscow could direct Ukrainian life as it would. It overawed the population for the moment but it did not reconcile them to their fate and it went hand in hand with the attempt to exterminate the old Ukrainian cultural life.

[Ukraine, 1933 -- Analyse]

5: Manning S-4 (no date) 1953 RD1 Ukraine RD1

CHAPTER ELEVEN

The Famine, the Soviets and the World

It is impossible to overestimate the significance of this 731 ●
artificially induced famine in what had been one of the richest portions of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. Taken in connection with the collectivization of agriculture which had served already to uproot and exile or liquidate many of the most industrious and successful parts of the population of the Ukraine, it was distinctly noticed that the history of the Soviet Union had entered a new phase which might be glossed over for public consumption but still represented a formidable menace to the general development of the entire area.

During the years of the New Economic Policy and the period of [178]
Ukrainization, much had been accomplished, not only to repair the damages of the Civil War and the period of Militant Communism, but great strides had been made in the development of Ukrainian culture. The collectivization of 1929-31 had, in a sense, menaced some of the economic gains but while the menace of Moscow was being felt on the material field, it had not hitherto been regarded in the same way culturally. It is true that there had been going on a great debate between Khvylovy and his rivals but it is doubtful if either Khvylovy or Skrypnyk had fully appreciated the forces that were now unleashed.

There had never been any question that every few decades Ukraine had undergone severe droughts which had produced local famines, especially in the Ukrainian steppes. The disorders of Militant Communism had coincided with one of these periods and had produced the situation in 1921-2. Still, at that time, for his own purposes, Lenin had allowed relief to be sent from abroad to the victims. The agricultural situation in 1931-3 was not so serious and

731 the country might have escaped, had it not been for the methods of the government in draining off from the population the last possible reserves of food.

731 185 There can be no doubt that this was done deliberately, for every measure taken by the government was intended to increase the difficulties of the population and to prepare for the final crushing of the Ukrainian renaissance that had been proceeding with ever [648] increasing force. Every measure, too, was intended to render it more difficult for the outside world to secure any actual knowledge of the conditions in the country until it was too late for the world to do more than register vain protests, for it was very definitely at this period that the censorship methods of the government and its apprehensions of what knowledge might bring to the world actively commenced to draw an iron curtain around Ukraine. Foreign correspondents were forbidden to visit Ukraine on one pretext or another and they were forced to send out such news as the government wished or to leave the Soviet Union.

[661] The collectivization and the famine had coincided with the beginning of the attack on Ukrainian scholarship and the arts, as we shall see, but these attacks by their very choice of victims had been directed against those men who had not been closely connected with the Communist Party in the past, even though they had not been entirely hostile. Along with the famine the tide turned, and soon the victims were those persons who had dared to hope for an equality of treatment (with the Great Russians) in the Soviet Union.

The famine was obviously intended not only to crush the population already impoverished by the collectivization but to administer a sound chastisement to all classes who were interested in the preservation and development of local and republic interests.

731 648 The famine was at its height in the winter and spring of 1933 and was only somewhat alleviated after the harvest of that year was brought in. It was only natural that, despite the efforts of the authorities, word of it would gradually seep out, in spite of the censorship. The news was most accessible to the Western Ukrainians, for as yet all communications had not been satisfactorily broken, and early in the summer they began to seek permission to organize relief

abroad for the benefit of the sufferers. On July 14, 1933, such a body was already formed in Lviv and soon in the other sections of Western Ukraine, while their appeals were heard by the Ukrainian emigrés abroad. 731 ● 648

In August, Theodore Cardinal Innitzer of Vienna had been convinced of the truth of the famine and he appealed for aid for the starving. In the same month the General Secretary of the Congress of European Minorities published his summary of the conditions, as gleaned from all available sources, and the League took action at its meeting in September. In the same month the matter was brought up before the League of Nations in Geneva and relief was referred to the International Red Cross.

The movement spread to the Ukrainians in North America and on November 3, 1933, the sixth convention of the United Ukrainian Organizations of the United States appealed to the government of the United States, urging that an impartial commission be sent to Ukraine to report on the truth of these reports.

This growing wave of protests among the Ukrainians and the emigrants from Ukraine was met by a stony silence on the part of the Soviet authorities, by absolute denial or by charges of unfriendly propaganda. The Soviet government refused to lift its barrier on any visits to Ukraine by foreign journalists or by any foreign visitors until after the harvest of 1933 was brought in and then they induced such journalists as Walter Duranty to recant previous statements as to the extent of the famine and report on September 18, 1933, that the harvest of that year was excellent "and all talk of famine now is ridiculous." [208]

Almost the first detailed account of an American journalist was given by William Henry Chamberlin on May 29, 1934, on his return from the Soviet Union, when he estimated that between four and five million peasants were starving and he also quoted the speech of President Kalinin of the Soviet Union, made the year before, "The collective farmers have passed through a good school. For some, this school was quite ruthless." 731 185

This was a polite hint again that it had been the policy of the government to allow the famine to run its course in the hope of

731 185 breaking any possible opposition on the part of the collective farms and the individual peasants.

The famine then on the domestic scene marked a definite turning point, a definite shift of emphasis in the relations between the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Soviet Union, and that shift was extended to the individual Ukrainian. Yet, the very reports that emanated from the stricken country were not without their significance for the world.

731 648 1933 was a fateful year for Europe. The order to apply the maximum pressure on the Ukrainians came on January 24th. On January 28th, just four days later and before the news could have leaked out, Kurt von Schleicher resigned as Chancellor of Germany and was succeeded by Adolf Hitler. Within a month came the Reichstag fire and all the turmoil connected with the advent of the Nazis to power.

A world that had still not been fully convinced of the dangers of the Communist regime was only too ready to magnify its benefits and its possibilities for good as compared with the apparently more pressing menace of Hitler. The period of the popular fronts began in all the European countries and it coincided with the coming into power of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the American bank crisis.

Under such circumstances, the rumors of the Ukrainian famine were heavily discounted by all except the most bitter anti-Communists and they obtained short hearing before world public opinion. No one wanted to believe these reports, and the troubled conditions when the reaction to the right seemed the menace to a world desirous of peace made it seem logical that the democratic world could secure some aid in its struggle from the Communist regime. All the old talk of the artificiality of the Ukrainian struggle that had circulated in 1918 was now reburnished and repropagandized.

The result might have been expected but it showed Stalin and the Soviet leaders that they had played their course well. They secured recognition by the United States in November of the same year, just as the real news of the extent of the tragedy was beginning

to leak out. Anger and disgust at Hitler was the dominant mood and behind that veil, the Soviet leaders were able to plan their further actions.

It is hard to tell what might have been the result, had the world awakened in that year to a realization of the dangers from the two totalitarian leaders, who were later to unite and start World War II. Yet already the evidence was there, if men would only understand.

In the period of Militant Communism the victims had been chosen more or less at random and the world was largely aghast at the results, even though they did not understand. Now, by deliberate action the same thing was being done on a larger scale and under the guise of law and order. This method proved successful and advanced the Soviet Union to a place of preeminence among nations, while it enabled the authorities to dupe many idealists in other countries.

From this point of view the deportation of the kurkuls in 1930-1 and the famine of 1932-3 represented the use of new methods of terror as an instrument of national policy. That policy was continued in the massacre of the Polish officers in Katyn and the Ukrainian peasants in Vinnytsya. It was continued in the purges that marked the thirties and in the show political trials that have marked the history of Communist rule in the satellite countries. They were the inauguration of a new policy that was not to meet with failure until its extremes began again by their ruthlessness to disturb an uneasy world in the days of the new cold war.

thousand karbovantsy in money. When we remember that, as a result of the Soviet tax system, a pair of shoes cost five hundred karbovantsy and a suit of average quality a little more than one thousand karbovantsy, we can see how dependent the average peasant is upon his small plot on which his egg tax is, whether he raises eggs or not, two hundred per year. In addition, from his cash resources he must buy the grain for his hens or raise it on his own plot.

It is small wonder that the foreign visitor is not welcomed on these collective farms except in a few places which are kept for show. In all of them the Communist heads receive very satisfactory living conditions with opportunities to purchase supplies at very moderate prices in shops devised for Communist administrators, and it is these administrators, and the Communists of the Motor Tractor Stations and the MVD who receive almost the entire income that is allotted to the collective farm.

The position of the city laborer is little better, although he receives in connection with his plant the opportunity of securing whatever the factory heads feel like giving him for food in the factory dining rooms.

In 1946-7, before Western Ukraine was fully Communized, there was another drought in the black earth region and once again starvation hung as a spectre over the entire population. Those who had the strength and courage to get to Western Ukraine in search of food were surprised how much food there was still to be found in those areas where the peasants were still allowed to use their own energy, skill and knowledge even on their own small farms which still looked like paradise to those poor devils who had passed through the period of the thirties.

Still later, collectivization was introduced into Western Ukraine and the other accompaniments of the regime in the east were at once apparent.

The Fifth Five Year Plan which was adopted in 1950 continued and intensified the process. From the figures which has been revealed, it is obvious that the increases which have been demanded of the Ukraine in this period are relatively minor. There

[Post-WORLD WAR II-1945 -- Analyst]

669 Ukraine. The 'Government of Soviet Ukraine' headed by Rakovsky left Ukraine and was abolished by order of Lenin. This was a new proof of the complete failure of the Russian Communist policy in Ukraine.

But at the same time the Ukrainian Republic met a new enemy who had claims on Ukraine. This was the Russian Volunteer Army under Denikin. The leaders of this army regarded the Ukrainian Democratic Republic as more dangerous for themselves than the Soviet dictatorship in Moscow. Therefore, in its struggle against the Russian 'Red Army', the Russian 'White Army' attempted before all to take possession of the Ukrainian territory in order to [648] prevent the strengthening of 'Ukrainian separatism'. In vain the Ukrainian Government appealed to the Western Great Powers that they should not admit the attack by the Russian Volunteer Forces on the Ukrainian Army and that they recognise the Government of democratic Ukraine. If in 1919 the Government and Army of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic had been given the least support by the Western Powers, the development of Eastern Europe and even the whole world would have taken another course than happened in fact. In any case, by securing an independent Ukraine, Russian imperialism would not be such a menace to the world as we see it to-day.

● [731] When Denikin's troops met the Army of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic in Kiev they attacked Ukrainian armed forces weakened by the struggle with the Russian Red Army and decimated by a disastrous typhus epidemic. This epidemic had spread principally in consequence of the blockade of the territory of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic. The Ukrainian Army had no medicaments, no clothing nor sanitary equipment, the Ukrainian soldiers died in thousands, and there was no help. From the army the epidemic spread among the population of Ukraine.

[727] But even under these incredibly hard conditions the Army of the Ukrainian Republic and the masses of Ukrainian people did not abandon the fight against the new oppressors — the Russian Volunteers — who had abundant support from the Entente Powers. The Russian 'Whites' forbade the Ukrainian language in schools, offices and the press in the Ukrainian territory they had seized. Russian authorities ordered the burning of Ukrainian books. The Denikin Government cruelly persecuted Ukrainian patriots. Even the word 'Ukraine' was forbidden; the expression 'Little Russia' was used instead. The Denikin Government restored the estates of the big landowners in Ukraine.

Against the Denikin régime in Ukraine extensive risings of the

there were 85% Russians and only 8% Ukrainians. With this election system the representatives of the peasants, the most numerous part of the Ukrainian population, made only 12,7% of the members of this Soviet Congress. Finance, national economy, railways, labour — concisely all foundations of the economic life of Ukraine — were concentrated in Moscow. All Ukrainian co-operative organisations were subordinated to Moscow. During 1920 Ukraine had to deliver to Russia 160 million of Pud of grain (1 Pud is 36 lbs.), 6 million Pud meat, 30 million Pud potatoes, 255 million eggs, big consignments of sugar, etc. The Russian Red Army made requisitions for its needs separately and confiscated in the last months of 1920 about 30 million Pud grain in Ukraine (*Collection of Reports of the Government of the USSR:* Kharkov 1921).

No wonder that in consequence of this exploitation the Urkrainian partisan movement was spreading. At the end of 1920 there were not less than 40,000 Ukrainian partisans in Ukraine who fought against the Russian Communists as an organised force. Evidence of the extent of this struggle is given to us in the trophies of the Soviet Russian troops seized in the war with the Ukrainian partisans 1920—21: 43 guns, 1,812 machine-guns, 31,788 rifles etc. *(Collection of Reports).* In the course of only one year, 1921, the Soviet Secret Police in Ukraine suppressed 6,000 partisan organisations. (*Communist:* Kharkov, February 11, 1923).

2. The Famine of 1921/22 and the Policy of Soviet Russia in Ukraine

The Soviet Russian Government took advantage of the horrible famine of 1921/22 in Ukraine and succeeded in strengthening its rule there. A drought in the fall of 1920 and spring 1921 was followed by a bad harvest, and a great dearth of food arose. A real famine began. However, the policy of the Russian Government in Ukraine, intending to get as much food as possible, did not change. Before the outside world the Russian authorities tried to hide the hunger catastrophe in Ukraine, and directed all foreign aid coming from America and Western Europe into Russia. Though in Ukraine in autumn 1921, millions of the Ukrainian population were starving the Russian Government, nevertheless, took away from the hungry regions the rest of the food stocks, and exported them to Russia. This roused the attention of foreigners who stayed at that time in Ukraine. The American historian H. H. Fisher writes in his book on the famine of 1921/22 that the representatives of the Soviet Russian Government demanded resolutely that it was

731 656 "necessary to request the ARA (American Relief Administration) not to split its forces, *but to concentrate them entirely on the Volga area*" (p. 248).

Professor Fisher remarks in his book:

"The policy of the Communist Party with respect to the Ukraine famine presents many curious aspects. Not only did the Moscow Government fail to bring the Ukrainian situation to the knowledge of the American Relief Administration as it did other regions much more remote, but it actively discouraged... anything likely to bring the Americans in contact with the Ukraine... Before the ARA had begun its operations (January, 1922) the Moscow and the so-called Kharkov Government did not undertake anything serious for the aid to the hungry people of Ukraine" (H. H. Fisher, *The Famine in Soviet Russia:* New York, 1927). Further, Prof. Fisher says in his book:

"From the first the Moscow Government had discouraged all proposals which tended to bring the ARA into contact with the Ukraine. Litvinov (at that time Deputy Commissar of Foreign Affairs, *P. F.*), had described the port of Odessa, back in the fall of 1921, as out of the question for ARA operations, although it was subsequently used very successfully. It is also significant that, until the ARA had investigated and established outposts in the south, Moscow virtually ignored in its press the famine conditions along the Black Sea..." (p. 252).

731 656 459 Prof. Fisher states that the Russian Communist Government exported food from the hungry regions in Ukraine:

"It is astonishing enough that these trainloads of food have been loaded in Kiev and Poltava and sent hundreds of miles to the hungry along the Volga, instead of being transported a score or so miles across the Gubernia line to Odessa or Nikolaiev, where there was a first class famine in swing. It is even more astonishing, when one learns... that Odessa Gubernia, with a crop of only seventeen per cent of normal and with people dying of hunger in the streets of its principal town as well as in the huts of its villages, sent sixty-five cars to Central Russia, while Nikolaiev, with a crop only four per cent of normal, and containing in the city of Kherson the most desperately afflicted spot in South Russia, in fact, one of the worst in the entire country, sent eight cars to the Volga" (p. 261).

On the export of grain from Ukraine during the famine of 1921/22 the American historian brings the following facts:

"The Gubernia of Podolia produced a considerable food surplus. The adjoining Gubernia of Odessa had a deficit, and many people were doomed to starve if food were not brought in. According to

the scheme officially outlined for the good of Russia, the surplus food in Podolia should not be used to save the lives of the peasants in Odessa, a few miles away, but should be carried through the starving regions, placed on board a steamer and sold in Hamburg ..." (p. 323). 731 656 439

A representative of the Relief Committee of Fridtjof Nansen who was in Ukraine at the beginning of 1922 gives the following facts on the famine:

"Eight million souls are starving in the south of the Ukraine, 2½ millions of them have absolutely nothing to eat. A further 2½ millions are feeding themselves on substitutes, such as hay, dried plants, etc., but are not getting any normal meals; three millions have some supplies, but in such small quantities that they will soon be reckoned in the first and second categories. It may be said that before the end of April 7 million souls will come under these two categories. About 700,000 little children who have been brought into municipal asylums do not receive more than one fifth of the normal portion. Child mortality is tremendous. It reaches 50%. In Zaporoje one million souls are litterally starving. 60% are children. Cannibalism is spreading. Ten thousand people die in Zaporoje daily. All the cattle and the horses have been devoured". (*La famine en Ukraine:* Genève, 1922). 731 656 261

The representative of the Nansen Relief Committee gives a picture of the famine in Ukraine as follows:

"The country side is parched, without trees or plants, almost entirely black. The straw of the roofs is being used to nourish men and animals. People relate that they first ate up all dogs, cats, crows that they could catch and then took to the starving cattle, to boot-leather and furniture wood. You hear accounts and find evidence of necrophagy and cannibalism. You speak with people who have devoured their children, their brothers and sisters. You see skeleton-like human forms lying in the peasant's huts, dying, or waiting without hope, to be rescued by death ... Usually no one takes the trouble, or no one has sufficient energy to bury the dead".

In the time when the Ukrainian people were starving in masses, the Russian Government took care only of the aid for the hungry along the Volga. The representative of the Nansen Relief Committee in Ukraine wrote in his report of 1922: 731 656

"At the beginning of this year one could have seen in famine-stricken districts of the Gouvernement Nikolaiev such proclamations: 'Workers of Nikolaiev: Come to the assistance of the famine-stricken of the Volga region!' This happened at a time when this

●731 Gouvernement had its own 700,000 sufferers, that is, about one half
652 of the population".

"The measure of misfortune here surpasses all that can be seen throughout the famine-stricken Volga areas", the author of the report on the famine in Ukraine remarks.

The horrible famine in Ukraine aggravated by the special 'hunger policy' of Soviet Russia helped the Russian Communists to destroy the partisan movement in Ukraine and to strengthen their rule.

185 *3. Ukraine in the Time of the 'New Economic Policy' (NEP)*

656 In 1921 Lenin proclaimed the 'New Economic Policy' in the
[423] Soviet state. From 1922 peasants and small private contractors were given some facilities. Small landownership was secured for 9 years for the peasants. Instead of requisitions a tax was introduced. Free trade was re-established. In order to appease the masses of the peasants of the peoples oppressed by Moscow, the Communist
[191] dictatorship made some concessions for the development of the national cultures. In Ukraine the Ukrainian language was given rights in schools, administration, in the press and judicature. This was the so-called policy of 'Ukrainisation'.

[631] The Union of Socialist Soviet Republics was proclaimed at the end of 1922 at the Soviet Congress in Moscow. The Communist organisation in Ukraine, consisting of foreign imported elements, particularly insisted upon the strengthening of centralisation with regard to the separatist tendencies of the Ukrainian movement (*Resolution of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Ukraine* from October 17, 1922).

186 But there were also voices among the Communists speaking
668 against Russian centralism. Thus, for instance, at the 12th Congress of the Russian CP in Moscow (April 1923) the Ukrainian problem extensively was discussed. The President of the Soviet Government in Ukraine, Rakovsky himself, had, after the experience with Ukrainian resistance, changed his former opinion on the Ukrainian national rebirth as a 'hopeless matter', his own expression in 1919. Now Rakovsky attacked those Communists who did not understand the importance of the Ukrainian problem and followed in Ukraine a policy of Russification. Rakovsky declared at this Co[illegible]ress that the Ukrainian problem belonged to those problems that "promise us a civil war ... I am beginning to fear for the further fate of the Soviet Government ... In Ukraine we succeed only with difficulties in forcing our organisations, carrying on their work in the conditions of a national fight, to understand the national problem. All our national policy in international relations

8: Fedenko H-4, 5 (no date) 1951 RD1 Ukraine RD1
Soviet Union R2

the former director of the Ukrainian National Library in Kiev, declared before the purge commission in 1933:

"I am being persecuted, because my name ends with 'ko', because I am a Ukrainian (*The First Results of the Purge:* Moscow, 1934).

6. The 'Organised' Famine in Ukraine in 1932/33

The purge in Ukraine was taking place in the conditions of a famine more terrible than that the Ukrainians had known in 1921/22. If the famine of 1921/22 was caused by extraordinary drought and bad harvest, and was only increased by the exploitation of the Soviet Russian Government, the famine of 1932/33 in Ukraine and the North Caucasus was organised by Moscow according to a plan made in advance: on the corpses of millions of Ukrainians the Soviet Russian Government wished to establish its forced collectivisation.

The reaction of the peasants in Russia and Ukraine with regard to the collectivisation was different. The Ukrainian peasant is attached to his own land in another way than the Russian. In Russia the remainder of the primitive 'obshchina', a system in which the whole land belonged to the community, every member of which received at periodical partitions allotments of land according to the number of 'souls' or 'eaters', still existed. For this reason the Russian peasant did not cling to his land, for he did not know how long he could till his allotment. Besides, the peasants in Russia, who were accustomed to obedience during the half of a millennium by the tyrannical régime of the Tsars, obeyed the order of the Soviet Government almost without resistance and went into the collective farms. The Ukrainian peasant, freedom-loving, with a feeling of personal dignity, refused to go into the collective farms, for he rightly regarded them as a worse economic system than serfdom was. Moscow knew the free, inflexible character of the Ukrainians, and organised therefore the famine in Ukraine in order to break the resistance of the peasants. For this purpose all food the Ukrainian peasant population possessed was in the course of 1932/33 taken by force through the Communist administration. These food stocks were exported to Russia or abroad. As the consequence of this a terrible famine began in Ukraine. The well-known American journalist W. H. Chamberlin calls it 'political famine'*).

Though rumours about the starving of the Ukrainians went abroad, Moscow stubbornly denied the fact of famine in Ukraine. To prevent the world from learning the true conditions in Ukraine

*) W. H. Chamberlin, The Ukraine a Submerged Nation: New York, 1944.

731 656 the Moscow Government, in 1933, forbade foreign journalists to enter Ukraine.

Back in the summer of 1932 the Ukrainian farmers in Canada addressed the Soviet Red Cross with the proposition to send their grain for gratis distribution among the hungry in Ukraine. But Moscow resolutely refused to accept this gift. The hunger catastrophe of 1932/33 was so great that the population of Ukraine died in masses, and cannibalism and necrophagy spread among the people. The peasants of Ukraine, weakened and decimated by the famine, were forced to enter 'voluntarily' the Soviet collective farms. Though the harvest of 1933 was good, millions of Ukrainians did not live to see it.

The dimensions of the devastations of Ukraine by the famine 'organised' by Soviet Russia were carefully concealed by the Russian Communist Government, and are even now kept secret. Only by chance some foreign correspondents learned about the results of this famine in Ukraine. W. H. Chamberlin writes in his book, *The Confessions of an Individualist:* New York, 1941, on the famine of 1933 as follows:

"There were many rumours of mass starvation, especially in the normally rich farming regions of Ukraine and the North Caucasus. The impression that something very abnormal was taking place in the villages was strengthened by the fact that the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs had introduced a new rule forbidding journalists to travel in Russia without special permission — a permission which was never granted when Ukraine and the North Caucasus were mentioned as destinations. The official explanation of this ruling would have deserved an international mendacity prize. It was that the presence of foreign correspondents would disturb the harvesting operations . . . The ban on journalistic travel was suggestively lifted after the new harvest had been gathered in — after there had been an opportunity to bury the corpses and to remove the outward signs of the famine —".

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The same author writes about his visit to the Ukrainian part of the North Caucasus — the Kuban Region:

"This had been one of the richest and most smiling agricultural regions in Russia . . . There was an amazing lack of domestic animals; one saw none of the dogs that had formerly rushed out barking when we entered Cossack villages. In the first house we entered at random we found that seven members of the family have died of hunger. Three had survived. We did not meet any peasant who did not tell us of the loss of relatives or friends".

On the famine in Ukraine Chamberlin writes:

"Poltava had acquired a particularly bad reputation; more than once we heard in Moscow of the carts that moved through the streets in the early morning, picking up dead bodies ... In Moscow it was easy to glib officials to deny to credulous foreigners that there had been any starvation. In Poltava famine could not be denied, although its extent was minimised ... While we were visiting a village called Zhuke, near Poltava, two local officials were carefully steering us into the homes of the petty officials of the local collective farm. Suddenly we decided to go into a house at random. We found a girl of fourteen huddled up on the bench which ran around the wall of the house. Had she a father? Yes, he was at work in the field. A mother? No, her mother and her four brothers and sisters had died during the last winter and spring. And her father, as we found, was still an edinolichnik, a peasant working his own land. Marvellous fatalistic stubbornness of a man who would see almost his whole family starve to death and still refuse to accept the new servitude of the collective farm!" (pp. 154—157). 731 ● 656

In talks with the population and the reprensentatives of the administration, Chamberlin learned that in 1933 there had died of hunger in the Poltava region almost 15%, in the district of Cherkasy in Ukraine about 30%.

Stanley Richardson, correspondent of the American 'Associated Press' sent on September 22, 1933, the following telegram from Moscow to America:

"Soviet Russia has this year such a good harvest that a repetition of the undernourishment which had recently caused heavy losses of people and domestic animals is imposible. These losses one could see during a journey lasting a week through Ukraine and the Caucasus, the granaries of Moscow".

Owing to the Soviet censorship, Richardson could not give any figures about the victims of the famine in Ukraine. He quotes only the words of a Soviet Commissar in Ukraine named Asatkin:

"A great number of cattle and horses had perished. An exceptionally great number of peasants left the famine-stricken territory, looking for better living conditions. Many of them did not return" (*Ukrainian Voice:* Winnipeg, 27. 11. 1933).

A correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian* who had been in Ukraine in the fall of 1933 gave a report on the Ukrainian hunger catastrophe, according to official Soviet sources:

In 1932 in Ukraine there had been 5,543,000 horses, in autumn 1933 only 2,772,000 remained — loss of 50%; the number of hogs diminished in the same time from 3,472,000 to 1,390,000; the number of sheep fell from 6,652,000 to 1,543,000. The top Communist

731 officials in Ukraine confirmed to the correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian* that in this country there had been a great mortality from hunger. Comparing the situation of that time in Ukraine and the North Caucasus with the situation in Russia, the correspondent of the *Manchester Guardin* came to the following conclusion when he said:

"It can be definitely stated that no provinces within a radius of several hundred miles of Moscow experienced the Ukrainian and North Caucasian extremities" (*Manchester Guardian:* October 19, and October 21, 1933).

The correspondent of a Jewish Socialist journal in New York, Lang, gave a description of the situation in the summer and autumn of 1933 in Ukraine: he saw how grown-ups and children were starving to death, he had been in totally depopulated villages where the inhabitants had died of hunger or fled from their homes (*Forwards:* 27. 12. 1933).

The American journalist Walter Duranty 'optimistically' estimated the number of the victims of the famine in USSR in 1933 as 5 million people. Of course, the principal part of these victims were in Ukraine, against which the Russian Communist régime was carrying its special policy of exstirpation.

In consequence of the famine and the repressions in Ukraine, principally men had perished. Therefore for instance, in 1932—33 the women in the collective farms in Ukraine were 60—70% of the total (*Communist:* Kharkov, 26. 1. 1934). The extent of child mortality was shown clearly in 1940; in the fall of 1940, the lack of births in 1932/33 forced the authorities to close parallel classes or abstain from opening first classes in many Ukrainian schools, for there where no children! The consequences of the famine in Ukraine could be seen in the decrease of the cultivation plain of the winter crops in autumn 1933: one million hectars less than in 1930 (*Izvestia:* Moscow, 16. 11. 1933).

661 731 656 Fully to realise the hypocritical policy of the Russian Communist dictatorship in Ukraine, one must add that Moscow tried to lay the responsibility for the famine in Ukraine on the Ukrainian Communists, who, as they pretended, 'had overstepped the Party line'. Many prominent Ukrainian Communists were arrested and shot under the pretext that they had caused the famine in Ukraine as 'agents of foreign capital'.

In the first years of their rule in Ukraine, the Russian Communists dreamt of world revolution and regarded the Ukrainian Western territories under the rule of Poland, Rumania and Czechoslovakia as a bridge for their armed 'march on Europe'. In connection

with this, to a certain degree, was the policy of 'Ukrainisation' directed in Soviet Ukraine: Moscow intended to gain sympathy for the Soviet régime among the population of the Western Ukrainian territories in Poland, Rumania and Czechoslovakia. The famine of 1932/33 in Soviet Ukraine roused great distrust and dislike of Soviet Russia among the Western Ukrainians. Therefore Soviet Russia destroyed thousands of intellectuals coming from the Western Ukrainian territories, among them Communists as 'agents who had worked for the money of foreign big landowners and capitalists' . . . 731 656 661

661 The Ukrainian nation, from the famine of 1921/22 and later years, suffered under the Soviet terrorist régime great losses of its biological substance. To this were added the enormous losses in World War II, in the risings and from the terror of both totalitarian régimes.

●731 In 1946 Ukraine had to suffer from a new famine in consequence of a bad harvest, and it must be stated that the policy of Moscow with respect to hungry Ukraine had not changed; the Ukrainian people received aid from the Communist Government only in a minimum degree. The principal aid came from America.

165 The statistics count the losses of the Ukrainian people during the Soviet Russian rule in Ukraine in millions. In 1917 approximately 30,000,000 people inhabited the territory of Ukraine within the frontiers of Soviet Ukraine before the outbreak of war in 1939. The Soviet statistics gave the figure of 31,000,000 inhabitants of Ukraine in 1933. The census of January 1939 counted a population of only 30,960,000 in Ukraine. These figures show clearly the consequences of the Soviet Russian policy of exstirpation in Ukraine. If a normal increase of population had taken place, the population of Ukraine should have reached at least 40,000,000. Thus Ukraine had had from 1917 to 1939 a loss of 10,000,000 inhabitants! (comp. Frank Lorimer, *The Population of the Soviet Union — History and Prospects:* Geneva, 1946).

An entirely different picture statistics show in Russia: from 78 million in 1926 the Russians grew to 99,3 million in 1939. These figures speak for themselves.

000 After World War II, the Russian Communist dictatorship is playing on the strings of the traditional Russian nationalism and imperialism more than before. 'The great Russian nation', 'the great Russian language' and similar epithets doubtless inspire the Russians and make them an obedient instrument of Moscow's imperialistic policy.

During World War II a new political trend appeared among the Russian emigrants who had fought at the beginning of the revolution in the 'White Armies' against the Communist dictatorship. This was the movement of so-called 'Soviet Patriots', who began to return in masses to Russia, especially from France, inspired by the prospects of the growth of the Russian Empire under Communist leadership.

In the Soviet Union the national movements of the subjugated peoples are officially regarded as the 'principal danger'. Therefore, the Soviet Government is making haste in 'liquidating' entire nations which Moscow has recognised as 'reactionary' — Crimean Tartars, the peoples of the North Caucasus, etc. Of course, the

U
433 During all this time the livestock of the Ukraine (see next
231 Section), was being slowly and laboriously built up by gifts from the
262 rest of the Union, by levies on Germany, and by natural increase.
731 Meat was very scarce, since no-one was willing to slaughter and further deplete the slender herds. Cows, used for draught purposes, gave little milk. Now added to these intense shortages of meat, fat and dairy products was another great deficiency of cereals and bread, hitherto the mainstay of the Ukrainian post-war diet.

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241 The 1946 harvest cannot, at the most optimistic estimate, be
433 reckoned at more than 40 per cent. of 1940 in cereals and vegetables per hectare sown.[1] There is no fodder for the jealously guarded
231 animals; shelter for them is also very scarce since the people themselves are only now moving out of dugouts. If the animals are slaughtered, the small supplies of dairy products and meat will soon disappear; and the problem of draught power will remain as acute as ever.

U
241 There is an agricultural dilemma in the Ukraine which a good
433 harvest would have gone far to break. Although extensive and con-
464 tinued demobilizations have been taking place, there is a great shortage of labour on the farms.[2] If manpower is taken from the farms to help produce the machinery necessary to liberate further men from the land, there may not be enough farm workers left to produce sufficient food for the factory workers. The poor harvest has aggravated this vicious circle.

The Soviet Government has attempted in various ways to meet this problem not only in the Ukraine, but throughout the Union. Everyone who is able to work does so; young people, old people, women. The
U women who worked during the war have remained part of the labour force
[462] in both industry and agriculture, and an increasing number are being recruited. In the Ukraine in 1946, women composed at least 60 - 70 per cent. of the farm working force.

SU
[464 At the same time as steps are being taken to concentrate more
241] workers in agriculture, the organization of the collective farms is
474 being overhauled and geared to higher efficiency. To accomplish this,
647 the Soviet Council of Ministers created on September 19, 1946, a Collective Farm Council, whose main tasks will be to elaborate measures for the improvement of collective farming. This Council which is authorized to call conferences of collective farm representatives when necessary, was set up for the purpose of "establishing strict control over the observation of collective farm statutes and for the solution
900 of questions of the collective farm structure." One of their primary

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1 One must also bear in mind the reduced area under cultivation.

2 The war losses are felt very acutely.

IV UNRRA ASSISTANCE TO THE UKRAINE

Distribution of UNRRA Supplies

UNRRA supplies for the Ukraine are handed over to the government at the port of entry (usually Odessa on the Black Sea); and the government is then responsible for arranging distribution.

Like most other countries receiving UNRRA help, the Ukrainian Government has established a special organization to supervise the reception, warehousing, and distribution of all UNRRA goods received. This organization - which has on its staff specialists in food, industrial equipment, agricultural rehabilitation, food processing machinery, medical supplies, transport, accounting and distribution - is called the Department of UNRRA Supplies, and is directly responsible to the Ukrainian Council of Ministers.

The Department (headed by Mr. V.V. Khomyak) works in close liaison with the various ministries of the Ukrainian Government, and with the UNRRA Mission. On the basis of decisions made by the particular ministries concerned, it draws up plans for the distribution of UNRRA supplies and keeps a central record of their sales and of the proceeds expended by the government for further relief projects.

Most UNRRA shipments for both the Ukraine and Byelorussia have arrived through the port of Odessa; and since early 1946 an UNRRA officer has been stationed there to handle problems connected with delivery. Before an UNRRA shipment comes in, the authorities at Odessa are notified of the ship's name, its expected time of arrival, and the nature of its cargo. As soon as possible after the ship lands, discharging of cargo begins. Stevedoring labour is supplied by the port commander's service organization, "Inflot", which also furnishes checkers to work in the ship's hold and on the docks, counting the supplies and reporting any damaged goods. As the cargo is unloaded, perishable items, such as clothing and cheese, are placed in warehouses on the docks, and seeds in a warehouse in the suburbs of Odessa. Packaged goods, such as canned meat, army rations, and juices, are piled on the dock at shipside and finally into freight cars.

Directives for the distribution of the supplies (based upon decisions of the recipient ministries concerned) are issued by the Department of UNRRA Supplies to the Ministry of Foreign Trade representative in Odessa, whose office then instructs the railroad and barge authorities, providing such information as the name and location of the organization or governmental authority receiving the supplies, and a description of the goods to be delivered.

UNRRA relief supplies are either sold to individual ration-card or permit holders, or distributed to collectives, co-operatives, and other

648 enterprises; and in accordance with the provisions of the UNRRA
731 agreement, the Ukrainian Government uses the proceeds for further
[647] relief and rehabilitation work within the country. Food and soap supplies for example are sold through regular trade channels to ration-card holders, or are delivered to organizations which use them for factory or community feeding. Clothing also is sold in stores against ration cards, or in the case of workers having a high rate of clothing and shoe consumption, against special orders. Used clothing is distributed free of charge to invalids of the war, families of war dead, pensioners, or other recipients of social welfare. Medical supplies and equipment are transferred free of charge to the Ministry of Health. The distribution of agricultural and industrial equipment varies depending upon the nature of the supplies. Consumable items, such as seeds, jute, bagging, rope and industrial raw materials, are sold to collectives, state farms, co-operatives, or industrial enterprises. Capital equipment such as tractors, food processing machinery, or power generators is delivered free of charge to the recipient ministries or their subsidiary distribution organizations. Tractors in particular are delivered in this way to state-owned Machine Tractor Stations.

Proceeds of Sale of UNRRA Supplies

648 Up to March 1, 1947, the sale of UNRRA supplies in the Ukraine
731 had provided the government with 3,166,482,000 roubles[1] for additional
652 relief and rehabilitation work in the Republic. Roughly 85 per cent. of this total resulted from sales of UNRRA food; 6 per cent. from the sale of clothing; and 9 per cent. from the sale of miscellaneous raw materials and agricultural supplies.

Of the cumulative proceeds up to March 1, about 21 million roubles had been used to pay the expenses of distribution, and 823,511 roubles had been spent to provide goods and services to the UNRRA Mission. Of the balance then remaining available (3,144,655,500), nearly half had been used for rehabilitation work at the Republican (state) level of government; 1,324,239,000 roubles had been transferred to regional executive committees (the next level of government) for expenditure on local projects; and about 391 million roubles in cash was still available for future use.

State Relief and Rehabilitation Projects

652 At the state level rehabilitation work carried on from the beginning
657 of UNRRA deliveries up to March 1, 1947, amounted to 1,429,060,000 roubles, and was divided among four main categories; rehabilitation of the national economy, 74 per cent. of the total state-level expenditures; health services, 14 per cent.; children's institutions and schools, 11 per cent.; and social welfare, 1 per cent.

Rehabilitation of the National Economy. These expenditures are administered by the various ministries having productive capital works

[1] 21.36 roubles equals one pound sterling; 5.40 roubles equals one U.S. dollar (March 1947).

652 657 under their jurisdiction. For example, capital works, repairs, and equipment for livestock raising centres, piggeries, cattle sheds, slaughterhouses and refrigerators (under the Ministry of Cattle Breeding); vineyards, orchards, repairs of irrigation facilities (under the Ministry of Technical Agricultural Production); repairs to barns and agricultural implements (under the Ministry of Agriculture); and rehabilitation of the brick and ceramic industry (under the Ministry of Home Construction).

Health Services. These expenditures are administered by the Ministry of Health, and include the feeding of patients, and repairs and equipment for hospitals and health service agencies.

[658] Children's Institutions (over four years) and Schools. These expenditures are handled by the Ministry of Education, and include the feeding of children; and capital works, repairs and equipment for schools and children's homes.

Social Welfare Services Directed towards the Betterment of General Well-being. These expenditures are administed by the Ministry of Social Welfare and include such services as repairs and maintenance of social welfare agencies, and assistance to invalids.

Local Rehabilitation

648 727 185 731 As at March 1, 1947, about 41 per cent. of the gross proceeds of UNRRA sales had been transferred to regional executive committees of the government for use in the local and district economy. The local projects - which are undertaken after approval by the state authorities and are subject to regular reporting and inspection - are similar in character to those carried out by the Republican Government Ministries. However, there is a considerable shift in emphasis. For example, at the regional level, nearly 57 per cent. of the total proceeds at their disposal was utilized for health services (hospitals, nurseries), 35 per cent. for children's institutions, 5 per cent. for repairs of public and industrial institutions, and 2 per cent. for the building of schools and repair of clubs.

Deliveries of UNRRA Supplies

648 731 In the original agreement between UNRRA and the Ukrainian Government was a provision that the Administration would "strive within the limits of its resources" to procure and deliver the Ukraine's share of relief and rehabilitation supplies before July 1, 1946. In the early months of 1946, however, it became clear that procurement difficulties and transport hold-ups would prevent a great part of the supplies from being delivered in time. The UNRRA-Ukrainian Agreement was therefore extended to the end of 1946.

From December 1945 (when UNRRA deliveries to the Ukraine began) up to June 30, 1946, (the time at which they were originally scheduled

648 731 to end) only 202,585 gross long tons of UNRRA supplies had arrived in the Ukraine. These consisted mainly of foodstuffs (three-fourths of the entire tonnage); while slightly less than one-tenth was made up of clothing, textiles and footwear; and 67 tons were medical equipment. Despite the urgent need of agricultural and industrial supplies, only 15,336 and 13,249 tons respectively had reached the Ukraine by the end of June.

By the end of January 1947, UNRRA shipments to the Ukraine from all sources amounted to 407,125 gross long tons; and the UNRRA Mission to the Ukraine reported that 372,796 tons of this had reached Soviet [504] ports. Delays in shipments during December and January were greater than usual because the port of Odessa for the first time in many years was frozen over, and ships lay icebound for days.

The following table shows UNRRA shipments in comparison with the programme.

TABLE XXII

UNRRA Shipments to the Ukraine up to January 31, 1947

	Programme (thousand U.S. dollars)	Shipments to January 31, 1946 (thousand U.S. dollars)	(gross long tons)
Food, feed, soap	100,189	94,587	287,519
Clothing, textiles, and footwear	16,856	16,801	15,095
Medical and sanitation	2,326	1,858	373
Agricultural rehabilitation	17,088	14,403	29,070
Industrial rehabilitation	51,591	34,077	75,068
Totals	188,050	161,726	407,125

Source : UNRRA Headquarters, Washington.

Industrial Rehabilitation Supplies

731 48 433 As the table shows, 75,068 gross long tons of the total supplies shipped by January 31 were industrial rehabilitation equipment. These supplies have, however, been extremely slow in arriving. Up to the end of June 1946 only 13,249 gross long tons had reached the Ukraine, including United States army surplus equipment of about 20 electric power stations and generators, as well as some raw materials, chiefly rubber, tin, lead, copper and other metals, and welding electrodes. A small number of machines for use in automobile repair shops, and about 90 motor cars and trucks had also arrived; but the slow delivery of machinery to transport materials and process building equipment was a serious defect, since much of the rubble of war damage had been cleared away, and the lack of such supplies was a hindrance to

731 rebuilding. Between July 1, 1946, and January 31, 1947, however, another 38,744 tons of industrial supplies arrived, bringing the deliveries up to 51,993 gross long tons.

The following table shows the composition of all industrial supplies shipped to the Ukraine by the end of January 1947

TABLE XXIII

UNRRA Shipments to the Ukraine of Industrial Equipment up to January 31, 1947

	Thousand U.S. dollars	Gross long tons
Transport and telecommunications	620	949
Public utilities	18,975	27,451
Building repair equipment	5,030	3,209
Machine repair equipment	1,041	527
Miscellaneous consumer goods	307	97
Materials, chemicals, engineering stores	7,930	42,684
	174	151
Totals	34,077	75,068

Source : UNRRA Headquarters, Washington.

Many of the metals which have been received are being used in canning factories or in the manufacture of household utensils and dishes. Pipe supplies (the first shipments of which arrived in December) are being used to replace destroyed water and gas mains. Canvas tarpaulin has been distributed for use in mines and on the farms of the Ukraine. Although these supplies have unquestionably filled some of the needs, the UNRRA Mission reports that the quantities are too small and the task of reconstruction too great for them to make much impact.

About one-third of the industrial rehabilitation programme for the Ukraine consists of so-called "protocol" supplies - that is certain items of industrial equipment which in a previous trade agreement the United Kingdom had contracted to furnish to the Soviet Union. After UNRRA assumed responsibility in the Ukraine and Byelorussia, negotiations commenced for the transfer of this equipment through UNRRA. About the middle of 1946 arrangements were concluded; and it was agreed that UNRRA would take over and deliver these "protocol" supplies as part of the industrial rehabilitation programme. Similarly, UNRRA became financially responsible for those "protocol" supplies which had already been delivered to the Soviet Union for use in Byelorussia and the Ukraine.

By March 1, 1947, about 16,720,000 dollars' worth of "protocol"

731 433 648 supplies had been shipped to the Ukraine; remaining "protocol" shipments to the Ukraine are expected to amount to 923 tons and 784,617 dollars.

Included in these supplies are power stations, pumps, portable cranes, presses, electric locomotives, and electrical and telephone equipment.

Agricultural Supplies

731 241 648 The greater part of the tonnage in agricultural supplies consisted of seeds; by January 31, 1947, 15,669 gross long tons had been shipped. Most of these seeds had arrived in the spring of 1946; however, some of the bags were inadequately labelled, and the contents not easily identifiable. Because of this difficulty the seeds had to be given costly and time-consuming laboratory tests, which delayed distribution. At the same time, 2,600 tons of seeds were reported by the Ukrainian Government to be either diseased or infested with weeds, and therefore unfit for sowing. Negotiations are still in process for the replacement of these defective seeds by suitable types.

[407] As at the end of 1946 the amount of farm machinery which had arrived was small. For example, the UNRRA programme calls for the delivery of 1,600 tractors to the Ukraine, but only 310 had been received by December 31, and these came too late for autumn ploughing. They are being distributed to state owned Machine Tractor Stations for use this spring.

UNRRA shipments have also included 6,692 tons of bagging, 2,090 tons of fishing equipment, and 244 tons of dairy equipment. These are shown in the following table, which summarizes agricultural rehabilitation shipments to the end of January.

TABLE XXIV

UNRRA Shipments to the Ukraine of Agricultural Supplies up to January 31, 1947

	Thousand U.S. dollars	Gross long tons
Bagging	1,672	6,692
Farm machinery	1,517	2,941
Fishing equipment	651	2,090
Food processing equipment	551	1,122
Repair material and hand tools		312
Seeds	9,861	15,669
Dairy and poultry equipment	151	244
Totals	14,403	29,070

Source : UNRRA Headquarters, Washington

Medical Supplies

731 758 648 The UNRRA medical and sanitation programme for the Ukraine is extremely small in relation to the needs; and the rate of deliveries has been the poorest of any commodity group.

Up to the end of January 1947 the Administration had shipped to the Ukraine 373 gross long tons of medical and sanitation equipment valued at 1,858,000 dollars, leaving a balance still to be shipped of just over 468,000 dollars.

In a country where the destruction has been so great and where food supplies are so low, a medical programme of 2,326,000 dollars cannot make much impression; however, such equipment as has been received is being used to the best possible advantage.

743 Most of the hospitals and invalids' homes in the Ukraine are operating under appalling difficulties; and the urgency of the need for equipment and medical supplies is everywhere evident. The UNRRA Mission early in 1946 described several hospitals which they had visited in various parts of the Ukraine. Here is their observation of the one at Kremenchug:

"Kremenchug formerly had a good 450-bed general hospital, which was blown up by a thoroughly efficient demolition battalion when the Germans retreated. All equipment, including an 8,000-volume medical library and a well-equipped X-ray laboratory, was demolished. The only buildings which escaped destruction were seven small sheds and storage houses on the outskirts of the hospital grounds.

"The hospital staff recently installed 250 beds in these ramshackle buildings. In a number of wards the windows were bricked up because no glass is available, and the only light came from an unshaded 40-watt electric bulb in the corridor. Paint was flaking off the floor and the walls of the surgery; most of the roofs leaked, there were no indoor toilets; fuel was available to heat only the operating and delivery rooms and the nursery. (Four babies, on an average, are delivered each 743 day). Many of the patients had no gowns and no bed clothes, except 758 what they were able to bring with them. No soap whatever has been available to the hospital for some time; laundry was simply being boiled with a little soda, and the floors were scrubbed with a lye solution. The only surgical equipment we saw was a few dozen scalpels and haemostats in one small cabinet in the corner of the operating room, and two sterilizers.

"The doctor in charge told us that his patients received an average diet of 1,000 to 1,200 calories a day, consisting mostly of bread, potatoes, cabbage soup, and 15 grams of fat. (The low calorie intake is largely due to the inability of the patients to digest the coarse whole-grain rye or wheat bread, which is available in reasonable quantities). Theoretically the hospital is entitled to 2,500 grams

743 of meat daily for each thirty patients; but, since there is rarely
758 any meat to be had, it received 400 grams of dried milk as a substitute, or approximately 13 grams per patient each day.

"The hospital was so badly overcrowded that beds had been set up in the corridors and even in the yard. Some of these beds had been salvaged from the ruins of the old hospital, and consequently were badly twisted and charred."

The same general conditions prevailed in most of the hospitals visited. The fact that so much improvement has since been made with so little help promises the best use of future deliveries of UNRRA medical supplies. The programme includes in addition to dressings, drugs and chemicals, X-ray equipment and supplies, surgical instruments, dental equipment, and a penicillin plant.

Clothing

291 Since most of the Ukraine's clothing factories were heavily
[294] damaged or destroyed in the war, there is a widespread shortage of all
648 articles of wearing apparel. The limited UNRRA programme has fallen
731 considerably short of satisfying all the requirements; however, such supplies as have been sent - particularly textiles and shoes - have been economically used to help the most critical cases.

By the end of January 1947 UNRRA had sent the Ukraine 15,095 gross long tons of clothing valued at 16,801 dollars, leaving an unshipped balance of 55,000 dollars. The following table gives the composition of the shipments.

TABLE XXV

UNRRA Shipments of Clothing to the Ukraine up to January 31, 1947

	Thousand U.S. dollars	Gross long tons
Finished clothing	779	384
Blankets and comforters	902	522
Cotton textiles	573	321
Woollen textiles	3,487	1,359
Raw wool	2,240	3,729
Footwear	5,697	3,997
Upper leather	575	259
Sole leather	1,274	1,624
Hides	188	381
Miscellaneous textiles	183	149
Miscellaneous footwear	735	2,368
Unclassified	168	n.a.
Totals	16,801	15,095

Source : UNRRA Headquarters, Washington.

In addition to these items, UNRRA has delivered several thousand tons of used clothing and footwear contributed through voluntary relief organizations in other countries. Most of the contributed supplies are distributed to war invalids or to orphans of the war.

The thousands of pairs of shoes delivered by UNRRA, as well as shoes made in the Ukraine from UNRRA leather, are sold according to a rationing system, with miners and heavy industry workers receiving highest priority. Textiles (also rationed) are sold as piece goods, or are made into garments in Ukrainian workshops for sale to permit holders. UNRRA blankets and comforters are distributed chiefly to hospitals and childrens' homes; and hides and other materials furnished by UNRRA are used in the construction of orthopædic footwear or artificial limbs for wounded veterans.

Food Supplies

When the UNRRA Mission first arrived in the Ukraine, no data were available on the republic's exact food situation. The 1945 crops sown in a reduced area, under great difficulties of seed, fertilizer, and implement shortages, had yielded only a fraction of pre-war harvests. It was expected, however, that Ukrainian farms would produce enough grain to supply the population with bread and cereals until the 1946-47 harvest. UNRRA food supplies were therefore calculated to provide chiefly meats, fats (or equivalents in the form of army rations), and dairy products.

Altogether, UNRRA planned to use 100 million dollars of the Ukrainian budget for food. By the end of January 1947, all but 5½ million dollars of this had been shipped, as is shown in the following table.

TABLE XXVI

UNRRA Food Shipments to the Ukraine up to January 31, 1947

	Thousand U.S. dollars	Gross long tons
Grain and grain products	548	3,836
Meat and meat products	30,682	54,245
Fish	4,166	23,240
Dairy products	13,378	33,134
Fats, oils, soap	12,725	41,885
Pulses	615	4,558
Beverages	1,490	3,437
Soup- dehydrated	2,835	9,392
Quartermaster food	27,134	109,055
Other food	206	548
U.S. Dept. of Agriculture surpluses	608	3,689
Totals	94,587	287,519

Source : UNRRA Headquarters, Washington.

Most of the UNRRA food supplies delivered to the Ukraine are distributed to ration stores for sale to workers and their dependants. A large proportion (about 35 per cent.) also goes for communal feeding through dining rooms, health resorts, homes for invalids and the aged, and dining halls of trade schools. Hospitals, childrens' homes, maternity homes, and the like also receive a share (around 10 per cent.) (The food distributed to welfare organizations is delivered free of charge).

Apart from the food which UNRRA supplies, the Ukrainian people are dependent on whatever amounts of local produce may appear on various markets. According to the rationing system, the farmers are allowed to retain part of their produce to feed themselves and their dependants, and the farm's livestock; the state then purchases a certain quota for use in feeding the non-farm population. If any surplus then remains, the farmers may keep it, or sell it on the free market at uncontrolled prices.

In practice, however, because of the extremely poor harvests in the last two years, Ukrainian farmers have scarcely been able to feed even themselves; and the amounts of domestically produced food which reach the ration stores or the free market have consequently been small.

The following section describes the sources of food supply open to the urban consumers.

The System of Food Distribution

In the cities of the Ukraine there are three outlets through which foodstuffs reach the population:

(a) the ration stores, where the bulk of foodstuffs are sold at fixed prices to ration-coupon holders;

(b) the so-called gastronoms (commercial stores) where scarce, luxury items are sold; and

(c) the public markets, where collective farmers and peasants bring their surplus produce for sale.

Most of the rural areas and villages of the Ukraine are expected to produce locally enough food to feed the inhabitants; and as they are nearly all considered to be self-supplying, they receive through the central distribution system only sugar and sometimes bread. Their surplus farm produce (that is, food in excess of that needed for feeding people or livestock on the farm and not subject to collection or purchase by the state) is usually brought by the farmers to the public markets for sale to the urban population. The quantities of produce and the variety of items available in the free public markets vary greatly from season to season and from day to day; prices are equally unstable.

000 day to day; prices are equally unstable.

Ration Stores

443 Members of the UNRRA Mission have visited ration stores in all 484 the more important cities of the Ukraine. The city of Kiev, for 262 example, has about 300, all of them much alike. The typical ration food store serves from 2,000 to 2,500 families living in the immediate neighbourhood; if a family moves, it changes its ration card registration to a store in its new locality. Some stores, however, serve the employees of a particular factory or organization as well as a neighbourhood; others are limited to special categories of customers, such as veterans, pregnant women and nursing mothers, teachers, doctors, and scientific workers; these stores have a slightly more varied stock of goods; and in the case of shops for pregnant women and nursing mothers, the roster of customers is smaller so that there is no waiting to be served.

727 Except for bread, most of the food sold in Ukrainian ration shops in 1946 was supplied by UNRRA. Many of these relief supplies, however, did not fit into the established rationing system; therefore many rather elaborate substitution schemes had to be devised, particularly for U.S. army C, K and ten-in-one rations, which were often substituted for a variety of foods. These schemes were said to be in effect throughout the Ukraine, local bodies having authority to make minor changes in substitution values to fit whatever stocks of goods were on hand at the moment.

For example, according to the scheme effective in Kiev in March 1946, if a customer was entitled to buy one kilogram of meat or fish monthly, he might possible substitute 15 eggs, or 200 grams of powdered milk, or 800 grams of sausage, or a 600 gram can of UNRRA tushonka[1] provided any of these were available. In lieu of one kilogram of fat rarely available the customer might buy 60 eggs, or two kilos of cheese, or 3 kilograms of sour cream, or 1.6 kilograms of powdered milk, or 400 grams of peanut butter, again provided they were available.

The army ten-in-one rations are packed in two cardboard boxes, labelled "first half" and "second half". In Kiev the "first half" was considered to be equivalent to 500 grams of fat and 1½ kilograms of sugar; while the "second half" was equivalent to 2 kilograms of meat and 500 grams of sugar.

In Poltava in April 1946 one U.S. army K ration was being considered the equivalent of 800 grams of meat or 206 grams of fat; one C ration, equal to 925 grams of meat or 310 grams of fat; the first half of a ten-in-one ration equalled 1,500 grams of meat or 500 grams of fat, and the second half of a ten-in-one ration, four kilograms of meat or 1,330 grams of fat.

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[1] A canned meat mixture.

TABLE XXVIII

Ukraine: Food Prices in a Typical Public Market
(in roubles)

	June 1946	July 1946	January 1947
Bread, kilo	22.5	23.0	50.0 - 55.0
Meat "	about 60.0	70 - 100	60.0
Fish "	-	-	65.0
Milk, litre	16.0	15.0	16.0
Butter, kilo	190.0	190.0	230.0
Eggs, dozen	42.0	48.0	-
Cereals (various) kilo	-	50.0	-
Sugar	-	100.0	-
Vegetable oil	-	200.0	200.0

- Very little or none on sale. Supplies vary greatly but are never very large.

Source: UNRRA Mission to the Ukraine, Kiev.

UNRRA Supplies and the Food Situation

Until the produce from local farms became available in the spring and summer of 1946, the diet of the urban population of the Ukraine depended principally, apart from bread, on UNRRA food supplies, which in the beginning consisted almost entirely of U.S. army rations, plus some dried and evaporated milk and tushenka. Urgently needed fats and oils were slow in arriving; up to May only 8,596 tons had been received in the Ukraine. The shortage was critical, since domestic production was providing a rate of only 4 to 5 kilograms of fats a year per person, as compared with 12.8 in 1940 and 22 kilograms in 1929.

Very little food was being received from other parts of the Soviet Union, and a protracted dry spell was threatening the 1946 harvest. Official rations for almost all categories of consumers were low;

262 On the farms of the Ukraine the diet, although in some respects better, was for the most part, restricted and monotonous; bread and cabbage soup were the staple items; meat consumption was negligible and the intake of fats and oils, well below a pound a month per person.

262 The present situation compared with the spring of 1946 is much
731 worse. UNRRA food deliveries to the Ukraine are all but completed.
433 The 1946-47 harvest on which so many hopes were set, proved a dismal disappointment; and other areas of the Soviet Union, having been similarly affected by the drought, are not in a position to give assistance. Domestic stocks must therefore last until the next harvest; and the outlook until then is bleak.

434 On October 1, 1946, because of the shortage of domestically
262 produced food and the imminent cessation of UNRRA supplies, Ukrainian rations for all categories of consumers had to be reduced. For most people this meant either that their cereal ration was cancelled, or that their bread quota was lowered or both.

For example, heavy workers, light workers, and employees, - although still receiving the same amount of bread, are no longer entitled to the cereal ration of 2.0, 1.2, and 0.8 kilograms a month respectively. Dependents fare even worse: not only have they lost their cereal ration, but in addition, their bread quota has been cut from 9 to 7.5 kilograms a month. The bread ration for children also has been cut from 12 to 9 kilograms, and their meat from 0.4 to 0.3 kilograms; however, they still receive the same cereal ration as before (0.8 kilograms a month).

Rations for mothers vary of course, according to the occupational category; but their special allowances remain the same, providing approximately 745 extra calories daily.

In terms of calories, these bread and cereal cuts have reduced the diet of heavy workers from 3,757 calories a day to 3,527; light workers are down from 1,820 to 1,682; employees from 1,236 to 1,144; dependents from 895 to 704; and children up to 12, from 1,209 to 973.

The following table shows the ration scales now in effect. Six out of about twelve groups have been chosen to show typical differentiations. Special groups - for example, tuberculosis patients in
[737 institutions - have not been included. It should be noted that
000 dependents are defined as those who are not working and who have passed the age of 55.[1] Mothers usually work and draw, throughout their

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1 Previously the age was 45 years; but it has been raised in an effort to get all non-producers to work.

645 744 262 (a) In the districts most affected by the poor crops of 1946, all children are to be fed by state feeding centres under the control of the Ministry of Health. (Normally, the Ministry of Education is in charge of feeding some of the school children; and other groups are fed in varying degrees by the Ministry of Health and trade union organizations.) However, it is hoped that now by establishing all child feeding arrangements under one Ministry, children of all ages and population groups will be fed as well as is possible. Transport is one of the limiting factors of this programme.

(b) Measures are being taken to recruit and equip special medical teams for use in areas where any widespread symptoms of starvation appear. These teams will attempt to ensure that the best possible use is made of such palliative measures (for example, special protein foods) as are available.

Summary

241 727 The Ukraine has often been called the granary of the Soviet Union. Before the war it produced all the food required for its own population; it helped to feed other regions of the U.S.S.R.; and it produced nine-tenths of the grain exported from the Soviet Union.

This favourable position was abruptly reversed by the war, which left the Ukraine, after Byelorussia, the most devastated section of Europe. In August 1945 when this Republic applied to UNRRA for relief assistance, the most urgently needed supplies were food.

731 649 262 UNRRA's major contribution to recovery in the Ukrainian Republic has been in furnishing 100 million dollars' worth of food - a considerable amount, but very small in relation to the need. Distributed among the urban population of about 27 million, the per capita proportion is almost insignificant. However, the foods delivered by UNRRA were those in shortest supply and those most necessary to sustain the people

Since the disastrous drought, the amount of food available from domestic production is exceedingly small. Not even the very low bread ration is assured. Moreover, UNRRA relief is drawing to a close; and food shipments since January 1 have been negligible. The mission in Kiev reports: "The cessation of relief supplies of meats, fish, milk, and fats at this time is nothing less than a tragedy."

There is no immediate prospect of improvement in the Ukrainian food situation. Other areas of the Soviet Union, having been similarly affected by the drought, are not in a position to give assistance.

262
731 Everything depends on this year's harvest (1947-48). Meanwhile, the next three or four months are expected to be the worst period since the famine of 1922. No people in Europe who suffered under German occupation and devastation will continue to suffer from hunger in 1947 as much as will the people of the Ukraine.